













Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons and Causes”​[2]​ brought the anti-causalist consensus that had dominated the philosophy of action to an end with an argument aimed at establishing that explaining actions cannot be purely a matter of justifying them. He argued that it is not possible to account for the distinction between mere rationalizations and rationalizations that feature in the agent’s motivational set without appealing to causation. There are plenty of reasons for performing any given action and each of these reasons will justify/rationalize the action, but not all these reasons will be the reasons which motivated the agent to act and which truly explain the action. For example: I may have accepted an invitation to speak at a conference in Dublin because it was on the theme of metaphilosophy – a theme close to my heart. Or I may have accepted the invitation because the conference was held in Dublin, a city I always wanted to visit. Both reasons rationalize/justify attending the conference, but which is the reason on which I acted? Davidson argues that there is a simple answer that is available to the causalist: the reason on which I acted is the reason which caused my action. Since anti-causalists claim a) that explaining actions is a matter of rationalizing them and b) that reasons are not causes, this solution is unavailable to them. As a result, anti-causalists are unable to make the important distinction between justifications (including ex post facto confabulations retrospectively concocted to present one’s actions in the best possible light) and genuine explanations. The causalist, by contrast, can distinguish between explanation and mere rationalization and claim that in genuine action explanations reasons are rationalizing causes of the action.
   Davidson’s construal of the distinction between justifying reasons and explanatory reasons has very important implications for what it is we are asking about when we enquire into an agent’s reasons for acting. When I returned from my conference in Dublin my partner Mark asked: “did you have a nice holiday then?”, implying of course that my real reason for going to the conference was its location and the theme of the conference was a mere rationalization which I made up retrospectively to justify leaving him in charge of the school run in rainy Stoke-on-Trent. So Mark has a very strong grasp of the distinction between reasons which can be invoked to justify my action and the reasons which may have actually motivated me. Now, if Davidson’s solution is to be accepted, it implies that when my partner Mark wonders to himself “did she go to the conference because she wanted to discuss metaphilosophy or because she wanted to visit Dublin?”, he is effectively asking “what reason caused her to go?” rather than “what reason makes most sense of her going to Dublin in the light of all the things I know about her?” In my view Mark is not asking “which rationalization made her move her body in the direction of the airport?”, as one might ask “what made the car engine start?” My partner’s question is about selecting the reasons which make most sense of my going to Dublin. If the question is construed in this way, then once Mark has reached a conclusion about the considerations which best rationalize my action, he has also reached a conclusion about the “real” reasons which motivated me to attend the conference: no additional appeal to causation is required. His question is about which, amongst a range of practical arguments, would be decisive for me, given the kind of person I am. It is not about what practical argument initiated the causal sequence which terminated with my landing in Dublin.​[3]​
   Now, suppose one construed Mark’s question as asking “what rationalization most compellingly accounts for my partner’s action?” rather than “what reason caused her to act?” On this construal of the question, the reasons which motivate me to go to Dublin are not different in kind from the reasons which justify my going to Dublin.​[4]​ There is, in other words, no distinction in kind between rationalizations invoked prospectively in the context of deliberation and rationalizations invoked retrospectively to justify actions (either by an interpreter or by the agent herself). This is not to deny that agents are prone to confabulation and that they may not, given the opportunity, cover up the prospective rationalizations which motivated them to act with different and more noble ex post facto ones which present their actions in the best possible light. It is rather to make the point that the prospective rationalizations which motivate the agent, and the retrospective rationalizations that are invoked by an interpreter (or by a confabulator), have the same logical form; rationalizations operate in the same way prospectively and retrospectively: by commanding an action as the rational thing to do. The reasons which prospectively motivate an agent to act (and which, according to the Davidsonian causalist, capture the agent's “real” reasons for acting), are therefore not different kinds of reasons from those which are invoked to explain the actions retrospectively. Whether a rationalization is used prospectively by an agent or retrospectively by an interpreter, does not change the logical form of a rationalization. Reasons operate in the same way, i.e. they are species of justification, whether they are deployed prospectively for the purpose of deliberation, or retrospectively for the purpose of interpretation. Now, if reasons operate in the same way prospectively and retrospectively then one cannot say, as the Davidsonian causalist wishes to say, that the reasons which motivate an agent to act (prospectively) differ in kind from the reasons invoked to explain the action (retrospectively) because the former are rationalizing causes of the action, whereas the latter are mere justifications.




It is important to note that the notion of justification invoked by the anti-causalist who denies there is a distinction in kind between explanatory and justifying reasons is neither moral nor epistemic; rationalizations (be they prospective or retrospective) justify neither the truth of the epistemic premise nor the moral acceptability of the motivational premise in the practical syllogism that the interpreter ascribes to the agent. When Mark tries to explain my action, he is not assessing whether the belief that the conference is in Dublin is veridical, and so whether the practical syllogism “There is a metaphilosophy conference in Dublin (epistemic premise); I want to hear metaphilosophical papers (motivational premise); therefore I go to Dublin (practical conclusion)”, is sound. Nor is Mark assessing whether increasing one’s carbon footprint is desirable in the light of global warming and thus whether flying to Dublin is justified in the more robust sense of being morally justified. But while the notion of justification invoked in the explanation of action is neither moral nor epistemic, action explanation still is a form of justification because reasons command the action as the rational thing to do in the light of certain epistemic and motivational premises; they do not describe psychological processes. What explains my going to Dublin (on the view that the explanation of action is a form of justification) is neither my believing that the conference is held in Dublin nor my desiring to attend the conference, but the presence of a normative connection between the propositional content of the epistemic and motivational premises and the conclusion of the practical syllogism through which the action is explained. In fact, agents need not have silently recited any such practical arguments in order for their actions to be explained in this way.​[5]​
   I defended the view that explanatory reasons are not different in kind from justifying reasons in D’Oro (2007)​[6]​ where I claimed that there are two distinct questions, which the Davidsonian causalist conflates. The first is a conceptual question: “What does it mean to explain something as an action?” The answer to this question is: it is to rationalize it, to provide reasons in favour of the action. The Davidsonian causalist and the anti-causalist agree agree on this point. The second is an epistemological question: “How do we know whether an agent really acted for a particular reason?” The anti-causalist answers this epistemological question by arguing that the real reasons why an agent acts are established through a hermeneutic process where one weighs one rationalization against the other and ascribes the agent the rationalization which makes most sense in a given context. The Davidsonian causalist, by contrast, answers the epistemological question by stating that the specific reason for which the agent acts is the reason which causes the action. I argued that the difficulties one may encounter in answering the second (epistemic) question should not tempt one to change the answer to the first (conceptual) question and claim, as the causalist does, that the agent’s real reasons are the reasons which caused the action. For to do so is to change the logical structure of action explanation. Alfred Mele (2013)​[7]​ has replied to this charge by arguing that the causalist is not guilty of conflating the conceptual and the epistemic question. What motivates the Davidsonian causalist to identify explanatory reasons with rationalizing causes of the action, Mele claims, is not an epistemic concern but an ontological one. The causalist, he says, is willing to concede the epistemic point that we may never know what the real reasons why an agent acts are. What the causalist is not willing to concede is the anti-causalist’s claim that the real reasons why an agent acts are not independent from the rationalization through which it is identified. The existence of a psychological process, for Mele, is what distinguishes real people from fictional characters. An account of action explanation that leaves these psychological processes out of the picture, he claims, treats real people as if they were fictional characters. 
   In the following I put the bone of contention between Mele and myself in the form of an imaginary dialogue between a causalist and an anti-causalist. In a nutshell my (anti-causalist) reply to the Davidsonian causalist is that the distinction between real people with real psychological processes and fictional characters with only make-believe ones is irrelevant to answering the question “what are x’s real reasons for acting?” Since reasons command actions, rationalizations necessarily present actions as obeying reason’s commands; they are not descriptions of psychological states of affairs. I do not deny that real people (unlike fictional characters) have real psychological processes. What I claim is rather that these psychological facts of the matter are not the kind of explanans that rationalizing explanations can invoke because the explanation of action is a normative affair. Thus, the attempt to re-state the Davidsonian challenge to the anti-causalist in ontological rather than in epistemological key does not succeed in showing that Davidson’s objection to the causalist is legitimate. Anti-causalists should not take Davidson’s bait. Rather than endorsing the concept of a rationalizing cause they should expose the Davidsonian challenge as failing to take seriously the implications of the normative character of reasons.

Anti-causalist: If to explain an action is to rationalize it, then to choose between different action explanations requires choosing between different rationalizations, not between rationalizations and something else. If I asked you: which of these pears would you like? And you answered: I shall have the apple, then you would not have answered my question. Thus when my partner asks: “Now did you really attend the conference because it was on the theme of metaphilosophy or did you attend it because it was in Dublin?”, he is considering two practical arguments that could be ascribed to me to explain why I attended the conference. What he is asking is: “which goal (listening to metaphilosophical musings or visiting Dublin) is logically or rationally compelling”, not “which one of them is causally efficacious?” At least it seems to me that the question can be legitimately construed in this way, as asking not “which reason caused my action?” (as in “which electrical circuit caused the lights to go off?”), but “which practical syllogism makes most sense of my action?” And if this is the way in which the question is to be construed, then finding an answer to this question is not a matter of identifying what train of thought caused the agent to act. In fact agents may not have silently recited any internal monologues in order for the interpreter to reconstruct their reasons for acting by attributing a practical argument to them.
Causalist: To stick to your example then: “How do you decide which pear to pick?” Or in other words: “How do you decide which rationalization should be ascribed to the agent?” If Mark is looking for a conceptual connection between the explanans (the motivational and epistemic premise) and the explanandum (the action), then he will find far too many since there are several different practical syllogisms which could rationalize the action. Davidson would grant that to explain an action is to rationalize it since he is adamant that the explanation of action has a normative dimension that has no echo in the sort of explanations at home in the physical sciences. But what he maintains is that the reasons which are genuinely explanatory are the causes of the action. It is this move that enables him to pick one pear (one practical argument) rather than another. If the real reason why you attended the conference in Dublin was your love of metaphilosophical reflection, Davidson would argue, then your thirst for metaphilosophical reflection caused (as well as rationalized) your visit to Dublin. If you are a causalist, you can pick this particular pear (meaning of course, practical argument). If you are an anti-causalist you cannot pick pears out of the bowl in this way because all pears (read: practical arguments) in the bowl will justify the action, but none of them will cause it.
Anti-causalist: But the anti-causalist too has a way of distinguishing between generic reasons for acting and the reasons on which the agent actually acts. Maria could cycle to work to lose weight or she could cycle to be environmentally friendly. The more I know about a person’s profile (whether they care about their appearance, whether they care about their environment), the better I will be able to choose between these different rationalizations. If Maria is a member of the green party, recycles religiously and normally switches off all electrical appliances at night, then one might reasonably infer that she cycles to work because cycling is more environmentally friendly than driving, and that losing weight or keeping fit is not her reason for cycling to work. Simply stating that the reason why the agent acts is the reason which causes the action does not help in any way in determining what reason explains the action. The only factor which can help us determine which is the reason on which the agent acts is an account of whether the agent’s action coheres with certain goals. So if Maria’s cycling to work coheres with the goal of being environmentally friendly, cycling to work counts as a possible explanation of her cycling. If all other explanations are ruled out, then that possible reason will be the actual reason. But what makes us conclude that being environmentally friendly is Maria’s actual reason for cycling to work is not that it is the reason which causes the action but that it is the reason which best justifies it in the light of Maria’s overall profile. Saying that a reason explains an action if it is the one which causes the action does not actually help in any way in selecting the reason with greater explanatory power. And surely this is what we want to know: what reason is best suited to explain what Maria does. Going back to the original example, it does not help you to pick one pear rather than another. The claim does not do the work it is required to do.
Causalist: But what if Maria were overweight and had a desire to lose weight and a thorough examination of the goals that her action might fulfil reveals that she might have indeed carried out the action to serve all these diverse goals? How does the anti-causalist decide between the different rationalizations? Maria’s motive could be losing weight as much as saving the planet. The causalist can say that the reason on which Maria acts is the reason which causes her to act. The anti-causalist cannot say that.
Anti-causalist: I could use counterfactuals: would she do it were she naturally thin? It is like my conference example: would I have participated had it been held in Sheffield or Reading or at a hotel next to Milano Malpensa rather than in Dublin? We weigh one rationalization against another all the time quite effectively. When I say of my nine-year-old that she would not have come to the supermarket had she not known I was going to buy her a magazine, I have determined what her motivation for coming to the supermarket is, without leaving the space of reasons and entering that of causes. Had she been willing to come along without being promised a reward, then I would have considered ascribing her different motives. I may not always be able to determine the real reasons in this way, but I can in most cases.​[8]​
Causalist: But surely there will be some cases where we cannot confirm or disconfirm the counterfactuals. In such cases appeal counterfactuals will not help establishing what an agent’s real reasons in acting are. 
Anti-causalist: Yes, I can see that there are such cases. If so, the anti-causalist strategy will reach an impasse. But I do not think this is a big problem really, since the fact that the anti-causalist’s criterion for making the distinction between mere rationalizations and rationalizations which explain a particular agent’s action cannot be conclusive in every case does not entail that they are inconclusive in all cases. 
Causalist: My point is not that the anti-causalist does not have any criteria for making the distinction between explanatory and justifying reasons in most cases but that the causalist has a way of doing so at tie-break, when two or more rationalizations are equally compelling, whereas the anti-causalist does not. Thus causalism has an advantage over anti-causalism. So if you accept that there are some cases where the anti-causalist cannot come up with a definitive answer then you are effectively conceding defeat.
Anti-causalist: I am afraid I am not willing to abandon the view that the explanation of action is a matter of justification simply because the criterion I apply leaves some cases indeterminate. Deontological theories reach an impasse when an agent is confronted with a conflict of duty. The agent cannot choose precisely because s/he cannot apply a deontological criterion to make the decision. The same could be said about utilitarianism. There will be situations in which the utilitarian principle will be unable to adjudicate between two actions which generate an equal amount of happiness. The anti-causalist is in a similar predicament: I cannot apply hermeneutic criteria to choose between two equally compelling rationalizations. True. In my view, however, this is not a good enough reason to abandon a commitment to a hermeneutic conception of explanation any more than the fact that the utilitarian principle cannot be invoked to arbitrate between two actions which produce an equal amount of happiness is a reason for forsaking utilitarianism.
 Causalist: It seems to me you are conceding defeat.
Anti-causalist: Not really. What I am claiming is that you cannot settle the dispute as the Davidsonian causalist wishes to without changing the subject. To invoke the concept of causation to settle a hermeneutic dispute is to leave the space of reasons. Suppose that Serena Williams and Simona Halep had won an equal amount of games in a tennis set so that they had to play an additional game in order to determine who the winner of the set is. I put it to you that you could not ask them to play a game of football in order to decide who wins the tennis set. It would be equally wrong to settle a hermeneutic dispute about the meaning of an action by introducing a concept, that of causation, that does not respond to normative considerations. But this is precisely how the argument that it is the difficult cases (rather than the straightforward ones) which should settle the dispute between the causalist and the anti-causalist, seems to work. The causalist says that in order to decide between equally compelling hermeneutic explanations we need to make a move that does not belong to the game of the asking and giving of reasons. Reasons, as we have seen, command action. Explaining actions through reasons, therefore, requires presenting actions as abiding to the commands of reasons, not as caused by antecedent conditions, even if such antecedent conditions are psychological processes. Moreover I am not sure you have an advantage over me: how do you know what the agents’ real reasons for acting are? I doubt you would be able to see them even if you cracked their skull open. And if you cannot know what they are then you do not have an advantage over me.
Causalist: I think you may have misunderstood the nature of my objection to anti-causalism. My worry is not epistemic. The point I am making is not that identifying explanatory reasons with the reasons which cause the actions, as Davidson suggests, will assist in determining which is the reason on which the agent acts, thus enabling us to know with absolute certainty, for example, that Maria’s reason for cycling to work is to save the planet rather than lose weight, or that you went to the conference because you wanted to visit Dublin rather than because you wanted to listen to some papers in metaphilosophy. The point I am making is that in your case there is a fact of the matter about why you went to Dublin, even if Mark may never find it out, whereas on your account there is actually no such thing. The question I want answered is: “In virtue of what is it true that S acted for R?” not or not just “how can we tell that S acted for R?”​[9]​ On your account there are only practical arguments but no real psychological processes. In fact one might go so far as saying that you interpret your daughter’s behaviour as if she were a character in a Flaubert’s novel. You even interpret your own behaviour as if you had to understand it from a third person perspective. For the anti-causalist we are all fictional characters with no real psychological processes, just persuasive narratives made up by intelligent readers about our reasons for acting. But these narratives are only stories which, unlike real psychological processes, have no causal powers.​[10]​ 
Anti-causalist: I am not sure whether I see a problem with the claim that I have to interpret my own actions. If this claim commits me to the view that I am not infallible when it comes to understanding my own reasons for acting, I am very happy to concede that implication. I do not think that my knowledge of my own reasons for acting is incorrigible. Sometimes I know the reasons why other people act better than they do and vice versa. If the charge is that I do not endorse a Cartesian picture of the mind, I shall happily plead guilty to it. At any rate I think I am getting closer to understanding why you, and many others, have found Davidson’s challenge so compelling. The reason why many have found Davidson’s solution persuasive is that they think that in identifying explanatory reasons with the causes of the action Davidson provides a solution to the problem of mental causation which they claim is left unaddressed by the anti-causalist.
Causalist: I do not think you have quite addressed my objection. My objection is not driven by a Cartesian view of the mind and a commitment to first person authority. I am not arguing that agents have a privileged and incorrigible access to their reasons for acting. My point, as I just said, is that there is a fact of the matter about why (real) people act even when it cannot be known. There is something that makes the claim “Mark’s partner went to Dublin because of R” true even if we may never get to the bottom of the issue. Thus in my opinion there is a difference between your case and that of Flaubert’s character Madame Bovary. In Madame Bovary’s case if her actions are open to different interpretations, and the author does not write her true motivation in the text, then there is no fact of the matter about the true explanation for her actions, whereas in your case there is, even if it cannot be known. Your claim that the reasons which motivate agents to act are species of justification entails that there is no fact of the matter why an agent acted as they did. But there are thought processes which real people (unlike fictional characters) go through whether or not there is somebody to “read” or interpret them. And yes, I would also argue that it is these thought processes which are causally responsible for things happening in the real world. But my main point here is that in the case of real people, unlike that of fictional characters, there are such thought processes. Your interpretivism about action explanations ends up treating real people as if they were fictional characters. And this cannot be right. Consider the following scenario: 
At the end of the Battle of Trafalgar, Nelson went on deck in full admiral's uniform, medals glistening in the sun. He was promptly shot and died not long after. Some historians think he wanted to die saving England in order to achieve everlasting glory. Others that he couldn't face returning to England with the scandal currently breaking about his mistress Emma Hamilton. Others think he was just reckless and wasn't expecting to get shot. But suppose this is what happened. Nelson had a temporary memory loss, forgot where he was, and thought he was going for an afternoon stroll in the park. Since he didn't speak to anybody, give the game away etc., nobody will ever know the real reason Nelson went on deck. But surely it is perfectly coherent to suppose that there is such a reason. Are you denying this?​[11]​ 
Note the ingenuity of my objection, in case you missed it: in a real-life case, like my Nelson example, it seems obvious that there might be a mental event that nobody could ever know. In a fictional case, it is equally obvious that there couldn't be. E.g. it couldn't be a FACT that Sherlock Holmes acted in a certain way because he suddenly suffered a memory loss and believed he was going for a walk in the park, if Conan Doyle provides the reader with absolutely no reason to think that this happened. But it could be a fact that Nelson acted because he lost his memory for a moment and thought he was going for a stroll in the park, even though nobody could ever have any reason to think this. You draw the distinction between the rationalizations which motivate agents to act and other rationalizations in the manner in which Berkeley draws the distinction between ideas of imagination and ideas of sense, that is, by saying that both are types of ideas which are more or less coherent rather than by saying that ideas of perception represent something independent of them. By claiming that the rationalizations which motivate agents to act are species of justification your account leaves out an important ontological dimension of the problem, i.e. that there are real thought processes which real people have, and fictional characters do not have, unless of course they are written in by the author. 
Anti-causalist: I shall come back to the question of mental causation later. For the moment let me comment on this alleged difference between real and imaginary people. I am not convinced there is such a great difference between understanding fictional and real characters, not because I want to deny that whereas I exist, Sherlock Holmes does not really exist, at least in the weightier sense of existence, but because I think that we understand real people much in the same way in which we understand imaginary ones. When my daughter reads about the characters in Jacqueline Wilson’s novels she gets a good psychological training in how to understand real people. Moreover, is it not the case that we understand historical characters in the manner in which we understand fictional ones? What is the difference between understanding Cleopatra and Madame Bovary? What helps or hampers understanding is not whether the character is real or fictional but how much information we have about them. A vaguely sketched character in a novel will remain opaque, not because it is fictional but because it is roughly described; a distant historical figure may be hard to fathom because the records are poor, even if it is a real rather than fictional person. You could of course say that at least in the case of real (and living) people one could check ascribed motives against their real thought processes by asking them: “What was your real reason for acting?”. But such checks can only be part of the process of ascertaining the reasons why an agent acts and cannot be decisive, any more than confession alone can provide uncontroversial evidence of guilt. I am not sure I would believe my daughter if she told me that she comes to the supermarket because she wants to help carrying the groceries. The fact that an explanation comes from the horse’s own mouth does not make it the “correct” explanation, not only because the agent might be confabulating, but because agents could be mistaken about their real motives. Suppose that, in order to put an end to his endless speculations about my motives, Mark confronted me with the question: “Did you go to the conference because it was on the theme of metaphilosophy or because it was in Dublin?” And suppose I answered: “I went to the conference because it was held in Dublin”. He could still choose to disbelieve me, suspecting that I am a self-deceiving workaholic hiding behind the facade of an easygoing person who likes to have some fun. Or suppose I answered: “I went because it was on a metaphilosophical theme”. Even if Mark believed that I genuinely rehearsed a piece of practical reasoning about the intellectual value of the conference and that I did not explicitly or consciously think about my long-valued goal of visiting Dublin, he may still not be persuaded that my “real” reasons for acting had to do with the intellectual value of the conference. He might still suspect that, had the conference been in a less attractive city, I would have found my consciously rehearsed practical reasoning concerning the intellectual value of the conference less convincing.​[12]​ You think there is an important difference between real and fictional characters because, in your view, if two competing explanations of a fictional character’s action are equally plausible, there simply is no fact of the matter as to how best to interpret the character’s behaviour, whereas in the case of real persons (so you say) there is a fact of the matter about their reasons for acting, even if it cannot be known. And this fact of the matter is a psychological process even if we may never know what this is, as in Nelson’s case. But if the explanation of the actions of real people were so different in kind from the explanations of the actions of fictional characters, why is it that we sometime still choose to disbelieve people’s avowed reasons for acting even when we believe they consciously entertained those reasons and did not deliberately seek to mislead us? If agents do not have the last word on the meaning of their actions, then being able to accurately represent an agent’s psychological process (assuming it did happen) cannot be the criterion we use when picking one explanation rather than another.
Causalist: I said it before, and I say it again. My objection is not driven by the view that agents have privileged access to their own reasons for acting, which they know better than the interpreter. When I say that there is a fact of the matter about why an agent acted I am not saying that the agent has incorrigible knowledge concerning this fact of the matter. All I am saying is that I am committed to the claim that there is a fact of the matter even if it cannot be known (by the interpreter or even by the agent) whereas you are committed to the claim that there is no such thing. You are committed to some form of ontological or metaphysical indeterminacy about what reasons an agent had for acting.
Anti-causalist: Maybe so. May be I am committed to the view that the reasons why agents act are, or at least can be, indeterminate. Why should this be a problem though? Reasons do not exclude each other like causes, do they? I could have gone to the conference in Dublin both because of its theme and because it was in Dublin. My action could be genuinely rationally over-determinate. In this case there would not be a determinate answer to the question: “Did she go because she wanted to visit Dublin or because she wanted to listen to metaphilosophical papers?” But my reply to your worry about truth makers (“In virtue of what is it true that S acted for R?”) is that the presence of internal monologues, even granting they do occur (and whether or not they are incorrigibly identified by the agent as their reasons for acting) are simply not relevant to the correctness of the explanation. Note the ingenuity of my reply, in case you have missed it: I am not saying that there are no psychological processes but that truth, in the sense of adaequatio intellectus et rei, is not a criterion for the correctness of the explanation and thus cannot assist us in establishing whether “S acted for R” is the correct explanation and whether “R” is S’s “real” reason for acting. Once one rejects the idea that the criterion for the correctness of the explanation of action is correspondence to a psychological process (whether or not one is in a position to establish it), the difference between real and fictional characters becomes irrelevant to the task of determining what the correct/true explanation is. It is only if one accepts that correspondence (in the sense of adaequatio intellectus et rei) is the criterion to be used to determine which is the correct explanation that one has to deny (as you indeed do) that real people can be explained in the same way as fictional characters.
Causalist: Likening the explanation of real people to that of fictional characters is a big chestnut to swallow...
Anti-causalist: I am not so sure. To revisit your comparison between Berkeley’s arguments and mine: Berkeley claimed that we cannot draw the distinction between ideas of imagination and ideas of sensation by appealing to the fact that ideas of sensation represent something outside the mind whereas ideas of imagination do not. I claim that we cannot distinguish between the rationalizations which motivate an agent and other rationalizations by arguing that the former capture internal monologues whereas the latter do not. CORRECT. But the similarities between Berkeley’s argument and my own end here because my claim is not that real people do not have real psychological processes and thus that they are, to all extent and purposes, like fictional characters. My claim is rather that such psychological facts of the matter (even if one could know them) are not a criterion that can be invoked to select one rationalization instead of another because the explanation of action is normative, not descriptive. Since the explanation of action is normative, not descriptive (as Davidson himself would concede), psychological processes simply drop out as irrelevant – just as (dare I say it?) Kant’s transcendental object = x, or Wittgenstein’s beetle. And if psychological facts of the matter are explanatorily redundant then the distinction between real people and imaginary characters, important as it might be, provides no ammunition against the anti-causalist. Enquiring about the motives of real people is not an activity that is different in kind from that of enquiring about the motives of fictional characters in novels or films. The psychology of the fictional academic with a fictional daughter and a fictional obsession for metaphilosophy would have to be explained in exactly the same way as that of the real academic with a real daughter and a real obsession with metaphilosophical questions, even if one of them is real and the other is not. 
So, I rest my case. Davidson’s objection to anti-causalists is that they are unable to account for the distinction between justifying reasons and explanatory reasons without invoking the concept of causation. I initially construed Davidson’s objection as epistemic in nature, i.e., as stating that causalism is superior to anti-causalism because it is in a position to identify which, among a range of possible reasons, are decisive for the agent by invoking the concept of causation. I argued that this challenge is misguided because if one is to remain true to the concept of action, then choosing between one rationalization and another is a matter of determining which rationalization makes most sense of the action, not of determining which reasons caused the action.​[13]​ To invoke the concept of causation to settle difficult cases, I have argued, would be like asking Williams and Halep to play a game of football in order to decide the outcome of a tennis match. It was then suggested that I misconstrued the nature of Davidson’s objection. This objection, so it was claimed, is not epistemological, but ontological. On this ontological construal the objection states not that the anti-causalist is unable to determine which are the reasons that were determining for the agent, whereas the causalist can. The objection states rather that even if the psychological processes which caused the agent to act could never be known, in the case of real people, unlike that of fictional characters, there are psychological processes. The anti-causalist, so this reformulation of the Davidsonian objection goes, fails to distinguish between real people and fictional characters. Once again I argued that this challenge is misguided: the appeal to psychological facts of the matter (whether they can be known or not) changes the nature of the explanandum under discussion. Reasons, as we have seen, command action. Explaining actions through reasons, therefore, requires presenting actions as abiding to reason’s commands, not as describing psychological processes. Real psychological processes, whether they can be known or whether they forever elude us, cannot be invoked as a criterion to sift real from possible reasons because it is in the nature of reasons to command rather than describe. The Davidsonian challenge to the anti-causalist, both in its epistemic and ontological incarnation, changes the nature of the explanandum and, in so doing, asks us to leave the space of reasons.
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